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Abstract Individual-as-maximizing agent analogies result in a simple under-
standing of the functioning of the biological world. Identifying the conditions under
which individuals can be regarded as fitness maximizing agents is thus of consid-
erable interest to biologists. Here, we compare different concepts of fitness maxi-
mization, and discuss within a single framework the relationship between Hamilton’s
(J Theor Biol 7:1–16, 1964) model of social interactions, Grafen’s (J Evol Biol
20:1243–1254, 2007a) formal Darwinism project, and the idea of evolutionary stable
strategies. We distinguish cases where phenotypic effects are additive separable or
not, the latter not being covered by Grafen’s analysis. In both cases it is possible to
define a maximand, in the form of an objective function /(z), whose argument is the
phenotype of an individual and whose derivative is proportional to Hamilton’s
inclusive fitness effect. However, this maximand can be identified with the expres-
sion for fecundity or fitness only in the case of additive separable phenotypic effects,
making individual-as-maximizing agent analogies unattractive (although formally
correct) under general situations of social interactions. We also feel that there is an
inconsistency in Grafen’s characterization of the solution of his maximization pro-
gram by use of inclusive fitness arguments. His results are in conflict with those on
evolutionary stable strategies obtained by applying inclusive fitness theory, and can
be repaired only by changing the definition of the problem.
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It is plausible that ant colonies adjust their collective behaviour to maximize food
intake. Plants may regulate biochemical cycles to maximize photosynthesis under
different constraints of pH or water and carbon dioxide availability. A bird wing
shape may be built to maximize aerodynamic efficiency for different kinds of flight.
The application of such optimality considerations to understand the form,
physiology, and behavior of organisms has often enhanced the understanding of
biological processes (Maynard Smith 1982; Dawkins 1982; Parker and Maynard
Smith 1990).
The theory of natural selection itself was originally developed as a way of
explaining the perceived optimal fit of organisms to their physical environment.
However, much of the attraction of natural selection also stems from its ability to
understand processes involving social interactions, from iconic examples of sex
ratio evolution to the analysis of conflicts at all levels of biological organization
(e.g., Maynard Smith and Szathmary 1995; Bourke 2011). A long-standing question
in evolutionary biology is the extent to which natural selection leads individuals to
behave as if they maximize a common measure, ‘‘fitness’’, of fit to the environment
in all these different cases, and then what this fitness means.
In a series of papers, Grafen (2002, 2006, 2008) appears to have constructed
general results in the form of individual-as-maximizing agent analogies and
describes these results as a general formal statement of Darwin’s theory of natural
selection. What he appears to be after is the formal maximization of a function /
(z) with respect to an individual phenotype z. The problem then is to find the
appropriate function /.
In order to identify this individual maximand, Grafen describes, in particular with
his concept of ‘‘no potential for selection’’, the mathematical characterization of a
concept of evolutionary stability (‘‘no possible mutant would spread’’, Grafen 2008,
p. 425). This is supposed to go beyond more traditional concepts from evolutionary
game theory (Maynard Smith 1982; Eshel 1983) in two directions. First, it is based
on explicit population genetic considerations and, second, the characterization must
apply to an arbitrary genetic makeup of a given parental population.
Many steps of Grafen’s argument are sound. For instance, his stressing of the
importance of having a consistent usage of the word ‘‘fitness’’, and whose arithmetic
mean can be applied to understand the effect of natural selection even in cases
where biologists feel a need to consider geometric means (Grafen 1999, 2000). But
we are skeptical about the biological importance of the results reached on
maximization, for two reasons. First, the exact significance of Grafen’s (2006)
results on the maximization of inclusive fitness may easily be missed. They require
the assumption of additive separable phenotypic effects on fitness (ruling out
phenotypic interactions), which is stronger than additive separable genetic effects.
Hamilton’s (1964) model still works with the latter assumption and thus applies to
phenotypic interactions (the rule in the presence of social interactions). Second,
Grafen’s mathematical characterization of fitness maximization does not always
appear consistent with well-established population genetic and game theoretical
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considerations. In particular, it appears to us as inconsistent with inclusive fitness
theory.
In this commentary, we develop the above points. We discuss the validity of
different concepts of fitness maximization in Hamilton’s (1964) model of social
interactions, in the formal Darwinism project of Grafen (2014), and how these relate
to each other and to the idea of evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith 1982; Eshel
1983). This paper is organized as follows. (1) We start by discussing fitness
maximization in population genetics. (2) We analyze fitness maximization in
Hamilton’s (1964) model of social interactions, where candidate maximands depend
on gene frequency. With the possible exception of our comparison of partial and
total changes in fecundity under this model, our analyses are not new, but are
profitably set in a common framework. (3) We relate Hamilton’s model to the
concept of evolutionary stability, where candidate maximands now depend on
phenotypes. We then compare maximands under two different altruism models, one
involving additive separable phenotypic effects and the other not. While we show
that individual-as-maximizing agent analogies still appear formally correct in the
latter case, they generally do not provide new biological insights. (4) In light of




For simplicity, we assume throughout that evolution occurs in a haploid population
of constant size N without any class structure. We denote by wi the fitness of
individual i in this population, and follow Hamilton’s (1964) words in defining this
as the number of offspring in a daughter generation that descend from individual
i reproducing in a given parental generation. Because population size is constant,
mean fitness is equal to one ( w ¼Pi wi=N ¼ 1). If a trait or characteristic with
value yi in individual i is transmitted identically from parent to offspring, the change











wi=N ¼ Covðyi; wiÞ: ð1Þ
This is a particularly simple formulation of the classic result of Price (1970),
which is in agreement with Grafen’s (2008) ‘‘simplest model’’, and where the
covariance is taken over all population members.
It is tempting to set yi = wi in Eq. (1), which gives the change in mean fitness as
the covariance in fitness: D w ¼ Covðwi; wiÞ ¼ VarðwiÞ, but mean fitness should not
change over generations in a population of constant size ðD w ¼ 0Þ. What goes
wrong here? The answer is that the wi’s are not identically transmitted from parent
to offspring. This fact may be framed in terms of Fisher’s (1930) so-called
Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection, as explained by Price (1972).
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According to this interpretation, Var(wi) only represents a partial change in the
average fitness w, attributed by Fisher to ‘‘natural selection’’. But the total change in
w is also affected by changes in the ‘‘environment’’, which, in a model of social
interactions, encapsulates the genetic effects (and thus behavior) of other
individuals in the population. The change in the environment thus includes changes
in the genetic composition of the population as the result of natural selection. The
partial change Var(wi) isolates that part of the mean change about which something
can be said independently of what is know about the parental generation (Ewens
2011, p. 169), but this is exactly counter-balanced by the change in the genetic
environment from the parental to offspring generation.
The idea that natural selection always results in such a simple concept of
adaptation as an increase in mean fitness (the ‘‘mean fitness program’’ in the words
of Grafen 2008, p. 424) has been criticized and assessed in population genetics
(Moran 1964; Ewens 2004, 2011) and evolutionary game theory (Mylius and
Diekmann 1995; Metz et al. 2008). Yet Hamilton (1964) attempted to show that
‘‘inclusive fitness’’ would always increase. Hamilton’s result may thus appear as an
instantiation of the mean fitness program. However, we now show that Hamilton’s
1964 result is an instantiation of the partial change in mean fitness result. In so
doing, we will not use Hamilton’s notations, but follow his line of arguments
applied to a simple example. Hence, all results presented in the next section can be
seen as special case of Hamilton’s (1964) model.
Social interactions
Partial change in fitness
Hamilton (1964) assumed a population without spatial structure, with discrete and
non-overlapping generations, and where the fitness wi ¼ fi=f of individual i depends
on the average fecundity f in the population. In a model with only two alleles, the
fecundity fi of individual i may depend not only on the frequency pi by which it
carries the mutant allele, but also on the fraction pn,i of neighbours it interacts with
that carry the mutant. The fecundity of individual i can then be written as
fi = fb(1 - Cpi ? Bpn,i) for some baseline fecundity fb, fecundity cost C of
expressing the mutant allele, and fecundity benefit B received from neighbors that
express the mutant.
Fecundity fi is not identically transmitted across generations, because in general
pn,i is not identically inherited from parent to offspring (pn,i is part of the
‘‘environment’’). However, there are two further steps to Hamilton’s reasoning.
First, the population is very large, each allele is in many copies, and random
fluctuations in pn,i average out over all gene copies i of a given allelic type. Second,
the expected pn,i for individual i takes the form Rpi þ ð1  RÞp in terms of the
mutant allele frequency p in the total population (Hamilton 1964, p. 35), which can
be interpreted as saying that a fraction R of gene copies in neighbors are identical to
those of individual i, while a complementary fraction are mutant gene copies
according to its frequency in the population. For a mutant, this entails expected
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frequency R þ ð1  RÞp of interactions with other mutants and expected fecundity
fbð1  C þ R þ ð1  RÞp½ BÞ, while for a resident (or wild-type) it entails frequency
ð1  RÞp of interactions with mutants and expected fecundity fbð1 þ ð1  RÞpBÞ.
The difference between the two expected fecundities is fb(- C ? RB), and, the
average mutant frequency change in the population can be written as
Dp ¼ pð1  pÞ C þ RBð Þfb=f : ð2Þ
Because selection acts on fecundity differences in this model, Hamilton showed
that the change in allele frequency in the population is as if the fecundity of
individual i is
fa;i ¼ fb½1 þ piðC þ RBÞ; ð3Þ
which is a value that can be associated to each gene copy (equal to fb for a wild-type
and fb(1 - C ? RB) for a mutant). Hamilton (1964, p. 6) called this value
‘‘inclusive fitness’’, a semantic choice consistent with the usage in the population
genetic literature that inspired him, but is inconsistent with his own verbal definition
of ‘‘fitness’’ as a number of adult offspring (Hamilton 1964, p. 1), which matches wi
defined above. In order to avoid such semantic inconsistencies, and further semantic
difficulties that arise in models of spatially structured population (where regulation
is local), we prefer to call this value ‘‘fecundity asif’’ to emphasize the precise
interpretation of Eq. (3).
With the definition of fecundity asif, the expected fecundity of individual i can be
written as
E½fi ¼ fa;i þ fbBð1  RÞp; ð4Þ
which is the sum of fecundity asif and a remainder term depending on population
allele frequency. The total change in fecundity asif is then given by
Dfa ¼ Covðfa;i; wiÞ ¼ Cov fa;i; ½fa;i þ fbð1  RÞpB=f
  ¼ Varðfa;iÞ=f . Using the
explicit expression for fa,i and the identity Covðpi; piÞ ¼ VarðpiÞ ¼ pð1  pÞ
produces
Dfa ¼ pð1  pÞ C þ RBð Þ2f 2b =f : ð5Þ
Therefore, the fecundity asif always increases in the population as long as allele
frequency change occurs, and the same argument can be made for the fitness asif wa,
defined in terms of fitness wi by dividing all expressions involving fecundity by f .
In Hamilton’s construction, the mean fecundity asif, fa ¼ fbð1 þ p C þ RB½ Þ,
acts as a so-called potential function, which is increased by evolutionary change.
That is, the gradient dfa=dp ¼ fbðC þ RBÞ of the potential points in the direction
of the steepest increase in fecundity asif, which is the path taken by allele frequency
change:




As proven, this result does not imply that fecundity is maximized under
biological scenarios involving social interactions. In fact, Eq. (5) only provides the
partial change in fecundity due to changes in allele frequencies in the population,
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but given the mean fecundity in the parental population. This mean fecundity also
changes as the result of allele frequency change. The key relationship is here
Eq. (4), where it is seen that differences among alleles in fecundity asif equal
differences in expected fecundity fi, but that the fecundity asif differs from fecundity
by a function of allele frequency which is Hamilton’s (1964, p. 6) diluting effect.
Total change in fitness
In order to obtain the total change, it suffices to note that each mutant allele imparts
a total cost -C and a total benefit B on the relative fecundity of the population. The
overall effect of each mutant on relative population fecundity is B - C. This is an
exactly transmitted property of each mutant allele. Hence, the total change in
average population fecundity depends on the extent to which allele frequency
change alters this value: Df ¼ fb B  Cð ÞDp, and using Eq. (2) produces
Df ¼ pð1  pÞ B  Cð Þ C þ RBð Þf 2b =f : ð7Þ
This shows that average fecundity will decrease in the population as genes with
higher relative fecundity increase in frequency: -C ? RB [ 0, but absolute
fecundity decreases (B - C \ 0); namely, when B \ C \ RB \ 0. A ‘‘selfish’’
mutant with positive direct effects but larger negative indirect effects on weakly
related neighbours is selected for. The case where a selfish mutant invades despite
imparting a negative effect on the whole population (R *0) is indeed an intuitive
case of this more general result, which also underlies selection-driven population
extinction (Matsuda and Abrams 1994).
To sum up, and as claimed by Hamilton, allele frequency changes proceed as if
fitness was proportional to fb[1 ? pi(- C ? RB)]. The average fecundity asif fa
therefore increases in the population as the mutant invades, and the same argument
holds for fitness asif. Indeed, Hamilton’s argument was that the change of allele
frequency due to selection proceeds as if individuals were changing behaviour to
increase their fitness asif. Hamilton’s (1964, 1970) model thus appears analogous to
previous works by Wright (1942) and Kingman (1961) to which he refers, and
which are instantiations of the ‘‘mean fitness program‘‘. In effect, Eq. (6) takes the
same form as the influential ‘‘adaptive topography’’ equation of Wright (1942). But
the analogy holds only as long as one deals with allele frequency changes, but not
with changes in fecundity or fitness, as there is nothing in Hamilton’s result that
prevents these quantities from going down.
Optimization
Continuum of phenotypes
So far, the fecundity asif, fa,i, was not considered a function of all the alternative
phenotypes that can be expressed by an individual, and therefore not considered as
an objective function that can be maximized by varying its behavior over an
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arbitrary phenotypic range. But what Grafen is seeking in is his ‘‘optimization’’
papers (Grafen 2002, 2006, 2008) is such an objective function /(z), whose
argument z is the phenotype of an individual (more precisely that part of the
phenotype that vary with genotype holding everything else constant), and that can
represent its state, from physiological to informational.
In order to capture the (competitive) fit of an organism to its environment, this
maximand must allow one to characterize evolutionary stable strategies in the sense
that if all individuals in a population express the phenotypic value zH that
maximizes the objective function (such that /ðzHÞ ¼ maxz2U /ðzÞ, where U is the
set of phenotypes), no mutant with a deviant phenotype can invade the population.
The non-invadability condition of mutants is captured by the concept of ‘‘no
potential for selection in relation to the set U’’ in Grafen’s work (e.g., Grafen 2008,
p. 425).
Can one find such a maximand in the framework based on Hamilton’s model
described above? In order to answer this question, we write the fecundity cost C and
B explicitly in terms of an evolving phenotype, whose range U is assumed to be real
valued (continuously distributed phenotype). For instance, this phenotype could be
the probability of committing self-sacrifice (U ¼ ½0; 1). The fecundity of individual
i in an altruism model could then be written as
fi ¼ f ðzi; znÞ ¼ fbð1  ziÞð1 þ aznÞ; ð8Þ
where a is the increase in fecundity when a focal individual that has not committed
self-sacrifice interacts with an altruistic neighbor. This is a standard formulation for
an altruism model in the literature (Charlesworth 1978; Frank 1998).
The change in frequency of a mutant allele with phenotype z ? d in a wild-type
population with phenotype z is then given for a mutant with small phenotypic
deviation d by
Dp ¼ pð1  pÞd CðzÞ þ RBðzÞ½ =f ðz; zÞ; ð9Þ
where
CðzÞ ¼ of ðzi; znÞ=ozijzi¼zn¼z
BðzÞ ¼ of ðzi; znÞ=oznjzi¼zn¼z:
ð10Þ
For the altruism model, these marginal cost and benefit are -C(z) = - fb(1 ? a
z) and B(z) = fb(1 - z)a, respectively. It is in terms of such marginal costs and
benefits that Hamilton’s (1964) model should be thought of, otherwise the
relatedness coefficients would not behave as claimed and would depend on
frequency p of the mutant. In terms of the marginal cost and benefit, the fecundity
asif of individual i is fb þ pi CðzÞ þ RBðzÞ½ , its mean is faðz; pÞ ¼ fb þ
p CðzÞ þ RBðzÞ½  and all the results obtained in the previous section apply mutatis
mutandis. In particular, the mutant invades a population of wild-types when the
selection gradient SðzÞ ¼ ½ofaðz; pÞ=op=f ðz; zÞ is positive, as if individuals were
changing their behaviour to maximize their fitness asif. But what about maximi-
zation of the fitness asif with respect to z?
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Evolutionary potential function
Because the gradient S(z) is of constant sign, invasion of a mutant allele implies its
fixation in the population. By successive allelic replacement, the level of altruism in
the population will gradually change. For a constant mutation rate and phenotypic
variance, the change in phenotype under a trait substitution sequence assumption
(e.g., Metz et al. 1996) is proportional to the gradient: dz/dt = kS(z), where the
constant k of proportionality determines the rate of evolution. This equation for the
change in phenotype (which neglects the possibility of stable polymorphism in the
population) is the so-called canonical equation of adaptive dynamics (Dieckmann
and Law 1996; Champagnat et al. 2006), which can be derived by using the
population genetic assumptions behind Hamilton’s model (Lehmann 2012). It thus
applies to interaction between relatives and provides the direct long-term
phenotypic evolution counterpart to the short-term evolutionary model discussed
in the last section (Eq. 2).
It is useful to note that the selection gradient on the level of altruism can be










Evolution stops when dz /dt = 0. This occurs in point z where the selection
gradient vanishes: d/(z)/dz = S(z) = 0. It entails no change of allele frequency and
thus characterizes a candidate evolutionary stable strategy if /(z) is a local
maximum, so that no nearby deviant mutant can invade. Thus, if the individuals in
the population behave as if they were maximizing /(z), no nearby deviant mutant
can invade. In the altruism model, this entails maximizing
/ðzÞ ¼ R logð1 þ azÞ  logð1  zÞ ð13Þ
and expressing level of altruism zH ¼ ðaR  1Þ=½að1 þ RÞ.
In the absence of social interactions, the fecundity of an individual depends only
on its own phenotype (fi = f(zi) does not depend on zn, nor on z). Then, the inclusive
fitness effect can be written as SðzÞ ¼ ofaðz; pÞ=op ¼ ½df ðzÞ=dz=f ðzÞ and we can
take /(z) = log f(z), which is the logarithm of fecundity. If the individuals in a
population then behave as if they were maximizing log f(z) or simply f(z), no mutant
in relation to the whole set U can invade; and we can even remove the term ‘‘nearby
mutant‘‘ in this case. The maximand thus allows one to characterize evolutionary
stable phenotypes and provides an intuitive individual-as-maximizing-agent
analogy.
In the presence of social interactions, the fecundity of an individual no longer
depends only on its own phenotype and it is no longer clear what the maximand /
(z) really represent biologically. Indeed, in the altruism model given above (Eq. 13),
neither log (1 - z) nor log (1 ? az) have a clear biological interpretation in terms
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of vital rates of actors and/or recipients. Further, relatedness itself may depend on
the evolving phenotype, as occurs when dispersal is the evolving phenotype (e.g.,
Frank 1998; Rousset 2004). In these cases, the individual-as-maximizing-agent
analogy of /(z) becomes less seductive, even if formally correct. But /(z) still
retains a biological effect, as it determines the distribution of phenotypes at a
mutation-selection-drift equilibrium, and thus arises naturally in a model where the
continuum of possible phenotypes in U are explicitly taken into account under
arbitrary kinds of asymmetric interactions and environmental or demographic
stochasticity (Lehmann 2012).
Additive separable phenotypic effects
There is, nevertheless, a case where the evolutionary potential function takes a clear
biological interpretation in the presence of social interactions. Consider the altruism
model where the fecundity of individual i is written as
f ðzi; znÞ ¼ fb  cðziÞ þ bðznÞ ð14Þ
for some cost function c and benefit function b entailing additive separable phe-
notypic effects on fecundity. This is an alternative formulation to Eq. (8) of an
altruism model, and also appears in the literature (Frank 1998; Lion and Gandon
2009).
For this model the selection gradient is SðzÞ ¼ dcðzÞ=dz þ RdbðzÞ=dz½ =f ðz; zÞ
and one can define the evolutionary potential
/sðzÞ ¼ cðzÞ þ RbðzÞ; ð15Þ






If the individuals in the population behave as if they were maximizing /s, no
nearby mutant can invade, and this result applies more generally; namely, to all
cases where /(z) applies and where social interactions result in a fecundity function
(or fitness function) that is additive separable.
Equation (15) sums up the relatedness weighted cost and benefit of social
interactions, and is sometimes used as ‘‘inclusive fitness‘‘ in the literature, in
particular in reproductive skew or tug-of-war models (e.g., Johnstone et al. 1999).
This definition departs from the initial conception of Hamilton (Eq. 3) in a crucial
way. In effect, his equations also apply to all cases where gene action is additive
under weak selection (so that there are additive effects on fitness stemming from
differences in behaviour between competing alleles, e.g., Taylor 1989; Rousset
2004). For instance, they apply in the altruism model (Eq. 8), where phenotypic
interactions are not additive separable, but weak selection entails additive gene
action. Many other applications of Hamilton’s rule involve such phenotypic
interactions, e.g., phenotype-matching kin recognition (Reeve 1989) or the
evolution of sex-ratio, over-exploitation of resources, or policing (Frank 1998;
Wenseleers et al. 2010).
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Grafen’s program
We now discuss the results of Grafen’s ‘‘optimization’’ papers (Grafen 2002, 2006,
2008) in the light of the inclusive fitness and game theoretic results introduced
above. One of the main reason that we presented these results is that we failed to
find an unambiguous relationship between Grafen’s concepts of fitness and
maximization, and those used by Hamilton (1964) and in classical ESS calculations
with and without relatives (e.g., Parker and Maynard Smith 1990; Frank 1998;
McNamara et al. 2001). Therefore, our aim in the forthcoming section is not so
much to discuss all of Grafen’s claims about maximization (which we may not fully
understand), but rather to give elements that should help readers to evaluate future
clarifications of these claims. A major issue is to find the function to which Grafen’s
program applies. In our understanding, a function of at least two variables, such as
the fitness function, does not fit with Grafen characterization of the maximand. As
emphasized by Grafen (2008, p. 423), there is not even a concept of population
involved in the definition of the maximand, so that the phenotypes of different
individuals cannot be considered in this definition. This strict concept of
maximization thus excludes the concept of ‘‘best response’’ (Mas-Colell et al.
1995, p. 242), that is, maximization with respect to one argument by holding the
others constant, which actually often underlies ESS calculations (e.g., Parker and
Maynard Smith 1990; Mylius and Diekmann 1995). While the selection gradient is
a function of a single variable, it takes a value of zero at an ESS point and is thus not
the required maximand. The remaining candidate encountered above for a
maximand is the evolutionary potential function, from which we suggest that the
maximands proposed by Grafen (2002, 2006, 2008) can be retrieved.
Asocial worlds
In his first paper demonstrating the existence of a maximand, Grafen (2002)
assumes no social interactions. The fecundity (or survival) of an individual thus
depends only on its own phenotype (fi = f(zi)). In this case, we saw that if
individuals behave as if they maximize f(z), one obtains a characterization of
evolutionary stability so that no mutant can invade (‘‘no potential for selection in
relation to the set U’’). This has been noticed before and the maximands /
(z) = f(z) (or /(z) = log f(z)) form the basis of much of behavioral ecology in the
absence of social interactions (e.g., marginal value theorem, Charnov 1976) and
life-history evolution (e.g., semelparity vs. iteroparity, Stearns 1992).
Grafen (2002, 2008) proves the result that organisms may be regarded as
fecundity/survival maximizers under conditions more general than assumed above,
and extends it to an arbitrary ploidy, number of loci, and uncertainty. As
emphasized by Grafen himself (e.g., Grafen 2007a, p. 1248), it is not a conclusion
that natural selection will necessarily lead to optimization under such conditions,
and, importantly, the classical population genetic restriction to optimization noted in
the section ‘‘Fitness‘‘ (e.g., Moran 1964) still apply to his model. But by
emphasizing the phenotypic optimization and population genetic parts of the same
model, Grafen provides a more detailed justification of previous models assuming
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optimality, in particular in behavioral ecology (e.g., Charnov 1976), and his
characterization is sufficient to determine the candidate endpoints of the
evolutionary process when genetic constraints are ignored.
In effect, many parts of an organism appear as if they have been optimally
engineered. From molecular motors and pumps to swim bladders and the eye, there
are many morphological and behavioral traits that seem to ideally fit the prevailing
environmental conditions. The behavior of individuals from other species is taken as
constant in the maximand, so that the immune system, spider webs, or the ability to
evade predators, all fall to some extent into the ambit of Grafen’s model.
Social worlds
Additive separable phenotypic effects
In the presence of social interactions, however, the behaviors of individuals often do
no look as if there were at their best. Overexploitation of resources, nepotism, and
conflicts at various levels of social organization do not carry the hallmarks of optimal
design. Indeed, when the fecundity (or survival) of an individual depends on the
behavior of conspecifics, the Pareto optima of a game are often not Nash equilibria.
In his (2006) paper, Grafen extends his (2002) results and claims to show that in
the presence of social interactions individuals behave as if they maximize their
inclusive fitness effect (the maximand is verbally defined as such by Grafen 2006,
p. 552 and given explicitly by Eqs. 8–9). This is inconsistent with the
results discussed above, since the inclusive fitness effect is proportional to
S(z) = [-C(z) ? R B(z)]/f(z, z) and takes a value of zero at an interior candidate
evolutionary stable state [following the definition of Hamilton (1964, p. 6), the
inclusive fitness effect is dS(z)]. This inconsistency is resolved by noting that
Grafen’s construction of inclusive fitness is in terms of additive separable
phenotypic effects (e.g., Eq. 15, Grafen personal communication). Hence, the
maximand should be /s(z); that is, Eq. (15) or its generalization to asymmetric
interactions and/or stochastic demographies and environments. As discussed above,
this is but a special case of the domain of application of Hamilton’s model, and this
maximand is not the inclusive fitness effect per se, but still bears a simple enough
relationship to it for the two to be often confounded.
Dynamic sufficiency
We are actually further puzzled by Grafen’s (2006) treatment of the inclusive fitness
effect, because it seems that the kind of partial change Grafen is after is so partial that
it actually does not contain any inclusive fitness effects in its formulation. If so, his
characterization of ‘‘no scope for selection’’ and ‘‘no potential for selection’’ will
appear removed from the evolutionary stability considerations such as those outlined
above. If not, his results need to be reconciled with the following considerations.
Grafen (2006) compares changes in the transmission of a gene copy when a
single individual in a population of wild-types switches to the expression of a
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mutant allele. The result (Grafen 2006; p. 553, eq. 10) may then be seen to depend
only on the direct effect of the individual on its fitness, not on its effects on
related neighbours. Namely, on -C(z) [or -c(z)] rather than on -C(z) ? RB(z) [or
-c(z) ? Rb(z)] in our altruism example. This result and its derivation depart from
Hamilton’s logic in a crucial way. In the latter logic, the role of the inclusive fitness
effect in determining allele frequency change is recovered in the following
comparison: when a gene copy switches from one behaviour to another, the
behaviour expressed by any gene copy related by R to the first one should also be
altered with probability R. In other words, considering the fate of a single switch in
behaviour over one episode of reproduction is not indicative of the direction of
selection on a mutant in the presence of interactions between relatives, and thereby
decoupled from any consideration of evolutionary stability.
It is plausible that Grafen’s (2006) result for the change in allele frequency (his
Eq. 10) also applies to the case where there are several mutants. In this case,
however, the inclusive fitness effect in this equation will depend on allele
frequency, since relatedness depends on the distribution of allele frequencies in
the population (Grafen 2006, Eq. 3). Thus, the maximand will depend on the setups
of the two parental populations that are compared. But in Grafen’s approach, what
determines this setup is not considered. Indeed, since the model is not dynamically
sufficient, as emphasized by Grafen (2008, p. 431; 2007a, p. 1247), we are not in a
position to say anything about the parental population setup. We do not see,
however, how one can provide a formal foundation to phenotypic optimization by
letting the relatedness coefficient, and thus the maximand, vary with the parental
population setup. This criticism is not inspired by the classical population genetic
counterexamples to optimization found when dynamics sufficiency is taken into
account. But by the fact that Grafen’s characterization of ‘‘no potential for selection
in relation to the set U’’ is then at variance with the usual notion of non-invadability,
which is a procedure that allows one to determine the candidate endpoints of an
evolutionary process (e.g., Parker and Maynard Smith 1990; McNamara et al.
2001). This should take into account the likelihoods of various population
configurations in order to make predictions about the behaviors that are likely to be
observed in a population.
Indeed, Hamilton’s argument leading to the expression for change in fecundity
(or survival) in terms of relatedness (Eq. 4) shows that the parental setup matters
and must be chosen in a biological meaningful way, rather than considered as an
arbitrary given. In the simplest population genetic scenario without social
interactions, the change in allele frequency is of the form p(1 - p)s for some
constant selection coefficient s (Crow and Kimura 1970; Gillespie 2004), and thus
the direction of selection is given by s irrespective of p: we do not need to care about
making dynamically sufficient claims about p (this is one of the reasons why
Grafen’s characterization of the asocial case is relevant and also pertains to long-
term evolution). In Hamilton’s scenario, the change in allele frequency is similar in
form, p(1 - p)S(z), but, importantly, this result rests on the average genetic
structure in the parental population given p. In a more formal analysis of Hamilton’s
model, this genetic structure may be obtained as the result of a dynamically
sufficient analysis of probabilities of identity between pairs of genes (Rousset 2004),
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so that S(z) (and /(z) in Eq. 11) encapsulate the likelihoods of various population
configurations. Hence, the maximization of the evolutionary potential /(z) makes
prediction about the behaviors that are likely to be observed in the population in the
long run. By contrast, Grafen’s (2006) measure of relatedness (his Eq. 3), and then
his maximand, depend on the the realized distribution of allele frequencies in a
given parental population, so that it is not clear how its maximization pertains to the
behaviors to be observed in the population.
Under more general biological scenarios, the parental genetic structure may be
more difficult to characterize. One way of circumventing this problem it to derive
results for fixation probabilities (rather than allele frequency change), obtained as
integrals of some functions over sample paths of a stochastic process determining
likely properties of the parental population (Rousset 2003, 2004; Lehmann 2007;
Lessard and Ladret 2007). In such an approach, one still has to say something about
the likely state of the parental population in order to obtain a measure of the
direction of selection on a mutant and then to determine the evolutionary potential
individuals may appear to be maximizing as the result of natural selection.
Metamodel?
By contrast to the previous arguments, Grafen’s (2006) computation gives mutant
spread only under conditions decoupled from a consideration of evolutionary
stability. We thus have difficulties to reconcile this approach with Grafen’s claim in
his (target review) that his project has the status of a meta model (Grafen 2014), by
which the processes going on in other models can be understood. For instance, he
claims that the paper of Grafen (2007b) follows the assumptions of Grafen (2006)
and allowed to show that the results of Ohtsuki et al. (2006) for games on graphs
can be understood in terms of inclusive fitness effects. To do this, however, Grafen
(2007b) in his Appendix does not apply his characterization of solutions of the
optimization program, but precisely the dynamically sufficient approach on
probabilities of identity mentioned above.
Conclusion
Are there general conditions where individuals can be regarded as fitness
maximizing agents? Hamilton (1964) showed that one can attribute to each gene
copy a value, the fitness asif 1 ? pi(- C ? RB), such that the change of allele
frequency in the population due to selection proceeds as if individuals were
changing their behaviour to increase their fitness asif (called ‘‘inclusive fitness‘‘ by
Hamilton 1964). Here, -C ? RB can be recognized as being the average effect of a
mutant allele (Falconer and Mackay 1996; Lynch and Walsh 1998; Frank 1997), so
that Hamilton’s construction actually holds even in the presence of non-additive
gene action. But it provides exactly the same information about the operation of
natural selection and the behavior of individuals as the Price equation itself:
selection favors those alleles that are associated to the fitness of their carriers. Since
there is no general, nor even univocal, relationship between the change in fitness and
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allele frequency change under natural selection, any individual-as-maximizing-
agent analogy is constrained to depend on specific assumptions.
As illustrated above, such an analogy can be identified in the absence of social
interactions (Grafen 2002), and for social interactions between relatives when
phenotypic effects are additive separable. But owing to a lack of dynamic
sufficiency we failed to find a satisfying proof of this later case in Grafen’s (2006)
writings. When phenotypic effects are not additive separable (the rule when social
interactions occur), an individual maximand that is formally maximized in an ideal
evolutionary process (trait substitution model and additive gene action) can be
constructed. But no clear individual-as-maximizing-agent analogy emerges unless
further assumptions are made, like that of Pareto optimal evolutionary stable states
(characterized by maxzi;zj f ðzi; zjÞ þ f ðzj; ziÞ
 
when individual i and j interact), and
where individuals can then be regarded as fecundity (or group fecundity)
maximizers. This piecemeal identification of maximands makes us skeptical of
the importance in evolutionary biology of strict individual-as-maximizing-agent
analogies (i.e., strict optimization as opposed to concepts of best-responses). But for
all the maximands encountered in this paper, their derivative is proportional to
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness effect. This describes the direction of selection under
all conditions, a general message worth recalling.
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